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1Abstract
This paper discusses issues of axiomatic bargaining problems
over opportunity assignments. The fair arbitrator uses the princi-
ple of “equal opportunity” for all players to make the recommen-
dation on resource allocations. A framework in such a context
is developed and the egalitarian solution to standard bargaining
problems is reformulated and axiomatically characterized.
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: C71, C78, D60, D63, D70
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21 Introduction
In standard axiomatic bargaining models originated from Nash (1950), a
typical interpretation of the solution to bargaining problems is the recom-
mendation made by a “fair arbitrator” such as the Judge in civil trials, or
the function of the Dispute Settlement Body in the WTO mechanism, etc.
In such models, this recommendation is based solely on players’ utilities. In
many contexts, however, the “fair arbitrator” may have other principles in
mind when making a recommendation.
For instance, consider the distribution issue of a father’s inheritance
among his children. The father, as a “fair arbitrator,” may have the prin-
ciple of “equal opportunities” for his children and would like to distribute
his wealth among his children giving them equal opportunities to do well in
their respective lives. Likewise, when educational resources are to be allo-
cated among local public schools, the local government’s board of education,
as the “fair arbitrator,” may propose an allocation that “equalizes” school
children’s opportunity sets for future jobs, skills, college admissions, lives, etc.
In both of the above examples, each recommendation of a resource alloca-
tion by the “fair arbitrator” eﬀectively identiﬁes a proﬁle of “opportunities”
or opportunity sets for the individuals involved. The crucial diﬀerence from
standard axiomatic bargaining models in these examples is that the recom-
mendation made by the arbitrator is not based on utilities of the individuals
involved, but on opportunity sets that the recommended resource allocation
may give rise to the involved individuals.
This departure from considerations of utilities of individuals to concerns
of opportunity sets of individuals is well in line with the recent literature
on opportunities and equality of opportunities. One branch of the literature
is in political philosophy such as Sen (1980, 1985), Arneson (1989), and
Cohen (1993), while the other is in economics, see, for example, Sen (2002),
Pattanaik and Xu (1990), Kranich (1996), and Herrero (1997). In the latter
branch of the literature, each individual is characterized by his opportunity
sets, from which his well-being or welfare is evaluated.
An opportunity set of an individual is interpreted as a set of feasible op-
tions or alternatives available to the individual for living. Depending on the
context, those alternatives can be commodity bundles, or bundles of char-
acteristics àl aLancaster and Gorman, or bundles of functionings àl aSen
(1980, 1985), and Nussbaum (1988, 1993, 2000). A resource allocation in an
economy then identiﬁes a collection of opportunity sets, one for each individ-
3ual in the economy. Note that, for a given resource allocation, opportunity
sets of individuals are necessarily interdependent. Note also that diﬀerent
resource allocations can give rise to various collections of opportunity sets
for the individuals in the economy.
The question we address is, among various collections of opportunity sets
for the individuals involved, how the “fair arbitrator” should make the rec-
ommendation on a resource allocation that yields a proﬁle of opportunity
sets for individuals in the economy, which is deemed as “fair.” For this pur-
pose, we extend standard bargaining models to the setting in which each
individual is endowed with his opportunity sets, which are generated by his
consumption bundles given his individual characteristics, and, in which the
fair arbitrator makes recommendations based on proﬁles of opportunity sets
for the individuals in the economy.1 We present two related formulations of
extended bargaining models. In the ﬁrst place, we formulate axioms in terms
of proﬁles of opportunity sets. This formulation corresponds to standard bar-
gaining models. The advantage of this formulation is to have a general and
abstract framework to discuss bargaining problems in our setting. Since an
important component of our primitive information about individuals is their
opportunity sets, this formulation appeals directly to our intuition regarding
this important component. To have a better understanding of the underlying
allocations proposed by a solution to our extended bargaining models and
with the above general formulation in hand, we next formulate our axioms
in economic environments directly. For both formulations, we introduce the
egalitarian solution for extended bargaining models and study it axiomati-
cally.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces
our economic environments and our problem. Section 3 deﬁnes and axiomat-
ically characterizes the egalitarian solution in our context. Section 4 deﬁnes
and axiomatically characterizes the egalitarian allocation rule in economic
environments. We conclude the paper in Section 5 by brieﬂyc o m m e n t i n go n
our approach and the results.
1Gotoh and Yoshihara (2003) discuss allocation mechanisms which assign individuals
capability sets through distributing outputs produced by them. Their approach is quite
diﬀerent from the approach based on bargaining that this paper addresses.
42 Economic environments and bargaining prob-
lems on opportunity assignments
2.1 Economic environments
There are inﬁnitely many types of goods (commodities). The universe of
“potential goods” is denoted by Ξ, and the class of non-empty and ﬁnite
subsets of Ξ is designated by M, with generic elements, K, L, M,...,e a c h
is to be called a ﬁnite list of commodities. The cardinality of M ∈ M is
denoted by #M = m.F o re a c hM ∈ M, let us denote a generic commodity
bundle in R
#M





T h ep o p u l a t i o ni nt h ee c o n o m yi sg i v e nb yt h es e tN = {1,···,n},w h e r e
2 ≤ n<+∞.G i v e naﬁnite list of commodities M ∈ M,e v e r yi n d i v i d u a l
has a common consumption space Rm
+.T h e r e a r e k basic living conditions
in the economy, which are relevant for all individuals for the purpose of de-
scribing their objective well-beings attainable by means of their consumption
vectors. These basic living conditions can be interpreted broadly. For ex-
ample, they can be skills that individuals can develop through education, or
they can be occupations which individuals can engage in after the gradua-
tion at school. Or they can be characteristics of commodities in the sense
of Gorman (1980) and Lancaster (1966), or they can be various functionings
according to Sen (1980, 1985) and Nussbaum (1988, 1993, 2000). For our
formal analysis, we do not need to stick to a particular interpretation though
a certain interpretation may be more appropriate than other interpretations
for a given context.
Thus, an achievement of living condition f,w h e r ef =1 ,2,···,k,b y
individual i is denoted by bif ∈ R+. Individual i’s achievement of basic
living conditions is given by listing bif: bi =( bi1,···,b ik) ∈ Rk
+.T h e r ea r e
two crucial factors that determine the achievement of individual’s basic living
conditions: one is the amount of resources or commodities she can access for
attaining these living conditions, and the other is the individual’s ability
to realize these living conditions by utilizing commodities. Note that, given




+ which associates to every commodity vector
xi ∈ Rm
+ a non-empty subset cm
i (xi) of Rk
+. The intended interpretation is
that i is able to have access to each living-condition vector bi ∈ cm
i (xi) by
5means of his commodity vector xi. Each opportunity correspondence satisﬁes
the following requirements:
(a) For all xi,x 0
i ∈ Rm
+ such that xi ≤ x0
i, cm
i (xi) ⊆ cm
i (x0
i) holds;2
(b) For some xi ∈ Rm
+\{0}, cm
i (xi) ∩ Rk
++ 6= ∅ holds, and cm
i (0)={0};
(c) For all xi ∈ Rm
+, cm
i (xi) is compact and comprehensive in Rk
+;a n d
(d) cm
i is continuous on Rm
+ with respect to the Hausdorﬀ topology.
Requirement (a) is a monotonicity property: more commodities generate
“larger” opportunity sets. Requirement (b) essentially says that commodities
are “desirable”: they can help individuals in achieving positive levels of basic
living conditions. Requirement (c ) stipulates that any given commodity
bundle generates a bounded opportunity set. And ﬁnally, requirement (d)
says that “small” changes in commodity bundles lead to “small” changes in
opportunity sets.
Let CM be the set of all possible opportunity correspondences deﬁned on
Rm
+, which satisfy the above (a), (b),(c) and (d). Given M ∈ M,a neconomy
with x endowments of M-goods is described by a list e =( M,cm,x)=
(M,(cm
i )i∈N,x),w h e r ecm ∈ CMn, x ∈ Rm
+,a n dCMn stands for the n-fold
Cartesian product of CM.L e tEM be the class of all such economies with x
endowments of M-goods. Let E ≡∪
M∈M
EM.G i v e ne =( M,cm,x) ∈ EM,a
vector x =( xi)i∈N ∈ Rmn








For each individual i ∈ N,g i v e nM ∈ M and given i’s consumption vec-
tor xi, cm
i (xi) generates a opportunity set Ci = cm
i (xi) for i.A no p p o r t u n i t y
assignment is a list of n opportunity sets one for each individual in the so-
ciety. Given e =( M,cm,x) ∈ E,t h eset of possible opportunity assignments
for e ∈ E is:
C(e) ≡ {C =( Ci)i∈N ⊆ R
kn
+ | ∃ x =( xi)i∈N ∈ A(e):Ci = c
m
i (xi) (∀i ∈ N)}.
Note that for any e =( M,cm,x) ∈ E,a n yC =( Ci)i∈N ∈ C(e),a n d
any i ∈ N, the opportunity Ci is a compact, comprehensive set in Rk
+
containing the origin. For each i ∈ N and each living condition f =
1,...,k,l e tmaxf (Ci) be the maximum amount of living condition f by
2For all vectors a =( a1,...,a p) and b =( b1,...,b p) ∈ Rp, a ≥ b if and only if ai ≥ bi
(i =1 ,...,p); a > b if and only if a ≥ b and a 6= b; a À b if and only if ai >b i
(i =1 ,...,p).
6i that he can achieve under his opportunity set Ci ;t h a ti s ,maxf (Ci) ≡
max{bf | (b1,···,b f,···,b k) ∈ Ci}.L e t Σ ≡ {C | ∃e ∈ E : C = C(e)} be the
class of all such possible sets of opportunity assignments. Note that each
set C in Σ is compact in terms of Hausdorﬀ metric by the assumption (d)
of the opportunity correspondence and the fact that A(e) is compact for
every e ∈ E.A l s o , f o r a n y C ∈ Σ,i fC =( Ci)i∈N ∈ C,t h e nf o re a c h












j ⊆ Cj by the
assumption of (a), (b), and (d) of opportunity correspondences.
2.2 Opportunity sets and their ranking
Let K be the universal class of compact, comprehensive subsets in Rk
+ con-
taining the origin. Thus, C ∈ K implies that for any M ∈ M,t h e r ee x i s t s
cm ∈ CM such that for some x ∈ Rm
+, cm (x)=C.N o t et h a tf o re a c hC ∈ Σ
and every i ∈ N,t h e r ee x i s t sC∗








∈ C with C0
j ≡ {0} for any j 6= i.T h i si sf o l l o w e df r o m
the requirement (a) of opportunity correspondences and the deﬁnition of Σ.
Given C ∈ Σ, let us denote such C∗
i by mi(C) for each i ∈ N.N o t et h a tt h e
proﬁle (mi(C))i∈N is analogous to what is called in the standard bargaining
theory the ideal point, which is necessary for deﬁning the Kalai-Smorodinsky
solution [Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975)].
How are various opportunity sets measured by individuals in the econ-
omy? We assume that there is an objective way of ranking various opportu-
nity sets by individuals, where this objective measure of alternative opportu-
nity sets is formalized as a binary relation R ⊆ K×K.T h er e l a t i o nR satisﬁes
reﬂexivity: [for all C ∈ K, (C,C) ∈ R], completeness: [for all C,C0 ∈ K,
(C,C0) ∈ R or (C0,C) ∈ R], and transitivity: [for all C,C0,C00 ∈ K,i f
(C,C0) ∈ R & (C0,C00) ∈ R,t h e n(C,C00) ∈ R]. Thus, R is an ordering over
K.N o t eP and I are respectively the asymmetric and symmetric parts of R.
For all C,C0 ∈ K,w ew r i t eC>C 0 if for all b0 ∈ C0, there exists b ∈ C
such that b À b0. Note that, given the comprehensiveness of opportunity
sets in K,w h e nC>C 0, necessarily, we have C0 as a proper subset of C.
In this paper, we assume that the ordering R on K satisﬁes the following
two properties:
Monotonicity: For all C,C0 ∈ K,i fC ⊇ C0 then (C,C0) ∈ R,a n di f
C>C 0,t h e n(C,C0) ∈ P.
7Representability: There exists a real-valued, continuous function G : K →




It may be noted that, in our context, Monotonicity is a fairly non-
controversial property and it essentially requires that a “bigger” opportunity
set be ranked higher than a “smaller” opportunity set. Similar conditions
have been used in the literature on ranking opportunity sets, see for exam-
ple, Gaertner and Xu (2006), Pattanaik and Xu (2007), and Xu (2002, 2004).
Representability requires the function G representing the ordering R to be
continuous. See Pattanaik and Xu (2000), Xu (2004), and Savaglio and Van-
nucci (2006) for examples of such ordinal representations of a binary relation
over opportunity sets.
2.3 Bargaining problems on opportunity assignments
The formal problem that we are interested in is the bargaining problem
over opportunity assignments among individuals. Analogous to the standard
bargaining model, we can interpret each C ∈ Σ as a bargaining problem and
Σ as the domain of bargaining problems, and a solution to the problem is to
pick up a subset of opportunity assignments {C =( Ci)i∈N} from C. Then,
a bargaining solution in this context is a correspondence F which associates
to every C ∈ Σ, a non-empty subset F(C) ⊆ C.
How is our model related to the motivation discussed in the Introduction?
The following examples may help us in understanding our approach.
Example 1: Let k be the number of skills that an individual can develop
through education, and let x ∈ Rm
+ be an educational resource. Then, the k
dimensions of the opportunity set cm
i (x) ⊆ Rk
+ represent the types of skills,
and each element bi =( bif)f∈{1,...,k} ∈ cm
i (x) implies that individual i can
develop the level of each skill f up to bif, whenever he is educated with the
educational support x and some amount of his own eﬀort. The diﬀerence of
native talents among individuals is reﬂected in the diﬀerence of opportunity
correspondences among them. In this setting, the bargaining problem would
be to assign opportunities for future skills by allocating educational resources.
8Example 2: The WTO consists of many member countries and one of its
functions is to settle disputes among its member countries. Disputes between
or among member countries are really about net trades of goods, services or
capital. The Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO thus makes recommenda-
tions as how to structure net trades among the aﬀected member countries.3
Each member country is concerned about, for example, the aggregate employ-
ment rate, the growth rates of several sectors like manufacturing, agriculture,
and service, and the health condition of its population. These concerns cor-
respond to our notion of achievements. Each member country’s interests can
be captured by the country’s opportunity sets representing opportunities to
achieve a degree of employment rate, to have reasonable growth rates for its
concerned sectors, and to oﬀer its population a good health. The bargaining
problem can then be interpreted as follows. The Dispute Settlement Body in
the WTO mechanism acts as the fair arbitrator and it recommends the set-
tlements that aﬀect net trade based on equal opportunities for the disputed
member countries along the factors that we discussed above.
Example 3: O u rl a s te x a m p l ec o n c e r n st h ea l l o c a t i o no ft h eb u d g e tb y
a central government to its several local jurisdictions. In many cases, the
allocation of this budget intends for diﬀerent localities to have equal oppor-
tunities for growth and for access to clean water, for example. Growth and
access to clean water are two of the many factors that diﬀerent local jurisdic-
tions are concerned about, and local governments are concerned about their
opportunities along these factors. The bargaining problem in this example
can thus be viewed as how the fair arbitrator, the central government, makes
budgetary allocations on the basis of equal opportunies for diﬀerent local
jurisdictions along those factors such as growth and environmental quality of
each region.
3Quite often, disputes seemingly are about things like access to member countries’
markets and information, legal protection concerning trades from member countries,o r
pricing rules. These are rules governing trade between and among nations and they have
direct eﬀect on net trade between member countries. As a consequence, we can interpret
that disputes are really about net trade.
93 The egalitarian solution: a ﬁrst character-
ization
Given a social evaluation of opportunity sets R satisfying Monotonicity and
Representability and its representation G, the egalitarian solution we con-
sider in the paper is deﬁned as follows:
Egalitarian Solution: A bargaining solution FE is the egalitarian solution
if and only if : for every C ∈ Σ, FE(C)={C =( C1,···,C n) ∈ C :( Ci,C j) ∈
I holds for any i,j ∈ N and there is no other C0 ∈ C such that (C0
i,C i) ∈ P
for all i ∈ N}.
Thus, the solution FE selects all the undominated assignments, such that
in each of these assignments, everyone’s opportunity is indiﬀerent with any
other’s in terms of R.
3.1 Axioms on bargaining solutions
In this subsection, we shall present and discuss axioms on bargaining solu-
tions over opportunity assignments. It may be remarked that most of the
axioms introduced below are formulated in terms of opportunity assignments
without explicitly referring to a given G function representing the ordering
R over opportunity sets. Such axioms are considerably weak and can appeal
to our intuitions directly.
The ﬁrst axiom is the corresponding weak eﬃciency axiom in standard
bargaining models.
Weak Eﬃciency (WE): For each C ∈ Σ and each C =( Ci)i∈N ∈ F(C),
there is no C0 =( C0
i)i∈N ∈ C such that for every i ∈ N, C0
i >C i.
Therefore, the axiom (WE) requires that the solution should not select an
opportunity assignment that is strictly dominated by another feasible oppor-
tunity assignment. It may be reminded t h a t ,w h e na no p p o r tunity assign-
ment C0 strictly dominates an opportunity assignment C,w eh a v e[C0
i >C i
for every i ∈ N], which requires that, for each i ∈ N, C0
i is obtained from
Ci by expanding it “outwardly”; as a consequence, necessarily, each Ci is a
proper subset of C0
i.
10To introduce our next axiom, we ﬁrst deﬁne a symmetric problem. We
say that C ∈ Σ is symmetric if for every permutation π : N → N,a n df o r




i∈N ∈ C holds.
Symmetry (S): For each C ∈ Σ,i f (i) C is symmetric, and (ii) there exists
a C ∈ C such that it is weakly eﬃcient in C and Ci = Cj for all i,j ∈ N,
then there exists some C∗ ∈ F(C) such that C∗
i = C∗
j for all i,j ∈ N, and
there is no C0 ∈ F(C) such that C0
i >C 0
j for some i,j ∈ N.
The axiom (S) stipulates that, for each symmetric problem containing prob-
lems with identical opportunity assignments, the solution selects at least
one identical opportunity assignment if there is an identical opportunity as-
signment which is also weakly eﬃcient in the problem, and further, no op-
portunity assignment selected by the solution is such that one individual’s
opportunity set strictly dominates another individual’s opportunity set.
The following axiom is analogous to the axiom of contraction indepen-
dence in standard bargaining models:
Contraction Independence (CI): For each C,C0 ∈ Σ with C ⊇ C0,i f
F(C) ∩ C0 6= ∅, then F(C0)=F(C) ∩ C0.
The axiom (CI) corresponds to Nash’s Independence of Irrelevant Alterna-
tives in standard bargaining models. It requires that if an opportunity as-
signment is chosen from a “larger” problem and is still available when the
larger problem shrinks to a smaller problem, then it should be chosen from
the smaller problem as well.
Our ﬁnal axiom is an informational requirement on a solution to a problem
and is stated below:
Informational Invariance (II) : For each C ∈ Σ and each C =( Ci)i∈N,C0 =
(C0
i)i∈N ∈ C, if C ∈ F(C) and (C0
i,C i) ∈ I for all i ∈ N,t h e nC0 ∈ F(C).
According to the axiom (II), if two opportunity assignments are “equivalent”
in the sense that the two opportunity sets for each and every individual
speciﬁed by the corresponding opportunity assignments are ranked equally,
then whenever one opportunity assignment is chosen by the solution, the
other opportunity assignment should be chosen by the solution as well. The
a x i o m( I I )t h u si m p l i e st h a tt h ei n f o r m a t i o n a lr e q u i r e m e n ti no u rc o n t e x ti s
contained exclusively in the social evaluation ordering R. A similar axiom,
11called No Discrimination,4 is discussed by Thomson (1983) in the context of
fair allocation problems.
3.2 A characterization of the egalitarian solution
Before we present our characterization result, the following observations are
useful throughout this subsection. Let G be the real-valued, ordinal repre-




G(C)=( G(Ci))i∈N ∈ R
n
+ | C ∈ C
ª
.
Let ∂G(C) be the upper boundary of G(C).S i n c e C is derived from an
underlying economic environment e =( M,cm,x) ∈ E,w h e r ecm is a proﬁle
of opportunity correspondences satisfying the requirements (a), (b), (c), and
(d), and G is continuous on K, ∂G(C) constitutes a connected set in Rn
+.
Moreover, since C is comprehensive5 by the requirements (a), (b), and (d)
of opportunity correspondences, G(C) must be comprehensive. Finally, by
choosing G({0})=0for the zero vector 0 ∈ Rk





∈ C. Therefore, G(C) corresponds to a standard
normalized, non-convex, and comprehensive bargaining problem.
Given these observations, we can easily see that the solution FE is well-
deﬁned in the sense that for each C ∈ Σ, FE (C) is non-empty. This is
because, for each C ∈ Σ, its corresponding ∂G(C) always contains the vector
of equal real numbers, and the inverse image of this vector constitutes the
set FE (C). Thus, our next concern is to discuss a characterization of this
solution.
Theorem 1: The egalitarian solution FE is the unique solution satisfying
(WE), (S), (CI) and (II).
Proof. First, it may be checked that FE satisﬁes the four axioms of the
theorem.
4No Discrimination requires that if, for any allocation recommended by a solution,
there exists another allocation whose corresponding utility allocation is identical to that
of the ﬁrst allocation, then the second allocation should be recommended by the solution
as well.
5C is comprehensive if, for each C ∈ C and each i ∈ N with Ci 6= {0},t h e r ee x i s t sC0
∈ C such that C0
i <C i and C0
j ⊆ Cj for all j ∈ N\{i}.
12Next, we show that if a solution F satisﬁe s( W E ) ,( S ) ,( C I )a n d( I I ) ,t h e n
F = FE. Consider a bargaining problem C ∈ Σ, which is derived from an
underlying economic environment e =( M,cm,x) ∈ E. Suppose F 6= FE.B y




















and for each r ∈ R+,d e ﬁne
C (i;r) ≡ {C
0
i ∈ C (i) | G(C
0
i)=r}.
Consider comp{r∗} ≡ {r ∈ Rn
+ : r ≤ r∗},a n dC∗ ≡ G−1 (comp{r∗}).
Insert Figure 1 around here.
Since G is continuous, we can choose a subset C∗
s ⊆ C∗ so that (i) for each
r ∈ comp{r∗}, there exists a unique (C
ri
i )i∈N ∈ C∗
s such that [C
ri
i ∈ C (i;ri)












i holds if ri >r 0











holds. By condition (i) of the deﬁnition of C∗
s,
G(C∗
s)=comp{r∗}. N o t et h a t( i )r e q u i r e st h a tf o re a c hr ∈ comp{r∗},
there is a unique assignment in C∗
s such that its corresponding G-values are
r; (ii) requires that for any ri,r 0
i of r,r0 ∈ comp{r∗}, their corresponding
opportunity sets are either identical or related to each other by set-inclusion
domination; and (iii) requires that C∗
s is a closed set.
Now, by using the information of C∗
s, let us construct a new economy
e∗ =( M∗,b c1,x∗) ∈ E. Firstly, let M∗ ∩ M = ∅, #M∗ =1 ,a n dx∗ =1 .
Secondly, for each i ∈ N, let the opportunity correspondence b c1
i be given as
follows:










i = nx · r∗
i;a n d










Then, consider C∗∗ ≡ C (e∗) ∈ Σ.S i n c eC∗∗ ⊆ C∗ ⊆ C and G(C∗∗)=G(C∗),
we obtain r∗ ∈ G(F (C∗∗)) from (CI). Next, consider C4 ≡∪ π∈Ππ(C∗∗).
Insert Figure 2 around here.

















max ≡ maxi∈N (r∗
i) and r∗
min ≡ mini∈N (r∗
i).D e ﬁne, for each i ∈ N,a n
opportunity correspondence b c∗1
i :[ 0 ,1] → Rk
+ by:










i = nx · r∗
min;a n d






















i ,f o re a c hi ∈ N, comes from C∗∗.
Secondly, let us deﬁne c4n :[ 0 ,1]
n → Rk
+ by c4n (x) ≡∪ i∈Nb c∗1
i (xi) for each
x =( xi)i∈N ∈ [0,1]
n.T h i r d l y , d e ﬁne e4 ≡ (M∗(n),c4n,(x∗)
n) ∈ E,w h e r e












Note that for each x =( xi)i∈N ∈ [0,1]
n,i fx =( xi,0−i), c4n (x)=b c∗1
i (xi),
and in particular if xi = 1
n,t h e nc4n (x)=C
r∗
min
























i;a n di f
x =( x∗)








max. By these prop-












.M o r e o v e r ,C
¡
e4¢
is a symmetric problem containing












From the construction of C
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e4¢




















, which is the egalitar-




Insert Figure 3 around here.


















r4E. Thus, by (CI),
©
r4Eª
= G(F (C∗∗)), which is a desired contradiction,
since r∗ ∈ G(F (C∗∗)).





= ∅. By (II), clearly, F = FE.
It is easy to check the independence of axioms in Theorem 1, so we only
note the results and omit the detailed proofs here: Regarding (II), any proper
14subsolution of FE satisﬁes all the axioms except (II); regarding (WE), a solu-
tion which solely selects ({0},...,{0})
| {z }
n-times
from any bargaining problem satisﬁes
all the axioms but (WE); regarding (S), the Nash solution which is intro-
duced by Xu and Yoshihara (2006a) for (opportunity)-bargaining problems
satisﬁes all the axioms except (S); and regarding (CI), the Kalai-Smorodinsky
solution which is introduced by Xu and Yoshihara (2006a) for (opportunity)-
bargaining problems satisﬁes all the axioms but (CI).
Note that the (utility)-egalitarian solution to standard convex and com-
prehensive (utility)-bargaining problems was axiomatically studied by Kalai
(1977), where the solution is characterized by weak eﬃciency, symmetry,
and strong monotonicity. Our result of Theorem 1 suggests that the (utility)-
egalitarian solution to standard non-convex and comprehensive utility-bargaining
problems can be characterized by the corresponding axioms of weak eﬃciency,
symmetry and contraction independence. This indeed is the case, see Xu and
Yoshihara (2006). It may be noted that, in the standard convex (resp.n o n -
convex) and comprehensive (utility)-bargaining problems, the corresponding
axiom to our axiom (II) becomes redundant.
4 The egalitarian allocation rule in economic
environments
Though Theorem 1 gives us a good general understanding of the egalitarian
solution to bargaining problems in our setting, it does not say anything di-
rectly about properties of resource allocation mechanisms which realize the
egalitarian opportunity assignments in each economy. Quite often, it would
be useful to know properties of such mechanisms when the egalitarian so-
lution is applied to the concrete bargaining problems on economic resource
allocations. Moreover, in the context of fair allocation problems,c h a r a c t e r -
izing such mechanisms would be useful as well if the egalitarian opportunity
assignments are deemed to be desirable outcomes. For these purposes, in this
section, we reformulate our bargaining problems directly in economic envi-
ronments.6 We start the analysis by introducing some additional deﬁnitions.
An allocation rule is a correspondence ϕ which associates to every e ∈ E,
6A parallel analysis was also developed in the standard (utility)-bargaining problems
by Roemer (1988) and Yoshihara (2003, 2006).
15a non-empty subset ϕ(e) ⊆ A(e). An allocation rule ϕ attains a bargaining
solution F if and only if for every e ∈ E, c(ϕ(e)) = F(C(e)),w h e r ec(ϕ(e)) ≡
{C =( Ci)i∈N ∈ C(e) | ∃ x =( xi)i∈N ∈ ϕ(e):Ci = cm
i (xi) (∀i ∈ N)}. Then,
the egalitarian allocation rule is introduced as follows.
Egalitarian Allocation Rule: An allocation rule ϕE is the egalitarian rule





We now present and discuss relevant axioms on allocation rules that attain
bargaining solutions over opportunity assignments. We ﬁrst introduce an
axiom that is similar to weak eﬃciency in standard bargaining models. Its
intuition is straightforward.
Weak Economic Eﬃciency (WEE): For each e =( M,cm,x) ∈ E and





We shall denote the set of weakly economic eﬃcient allocations for e by
WE(e).
The next two axioms correspond to the axioms of symmetry and contrac-
tion independence introduced in Section 3.
Economic Symmetry (ES): For each e =( M,cm,x) ∈ E with cm
i = cm
j
for all i,j ∈ N, if x ∈ ϕ(e), then for any i,j ∈ N, cm
i (xi)=cm
j (xj).
Economic Contraction Independence (ECI): For each e =( M,cm,x),e0 =
(M,cm,x0) ∈ E with x ≥ x0,i fc(ϕ(e)) ∩ C(e0) 6= ∅, then c(ϕ(e0)) =
c(ϕ(e)) ∩ C(e0).
Informational requirements on allocation rules in the current setting are
stated in the following axioms.
Strong Economic Informational Invariance (SEII) : For each e =
(M,cm,x),e0 =( L,cl,x0) ∈ E with C(e)=C(e0), for any x ∈ ϕ(e) and any







∈ I holds for all i ∈ N,t h e nx0 ∈ ϕ(e0).
Economic Informational Invariance (EII) : For each e =( M,cm,x) ∈
E, for any x ∈ ϕ(e) and any x0 ∈ A(e),i f (cm
i (x0
i),c m
i (xi)) ∈ I holds for all
i ∈ N,t h e nx0 ∈ ϕ(e).
16Full Correspondence (F) : For each e =( M,cm,x) ∈ E, for any x ∈ ϕ(e)
and any x0 ∈ A(e),i f cm
i (x0
i)=cm
i (xi) holds for all i ∈ N,t h e nx0 ∈ ϕ(e).
It may be noted that (SEII) implies (EII) and (EII) implies (F). (SEII)
requires that, for any two economies having the same set of opportunity as-
signments, if an allocation x is chosen by the allocation rule for the ﬁrst
economy and if an allocation x0 is feasible in the second economy, then the
allocation x0 should be chosen for the second economy as long as every in-
dividual views the opportunity set generated under x being indiﬀerent to
the opportunity set generated under x0. (EII) is weaker than (SEII) in that
(EII) is conﬁned to the same economy, and (F) is weaker than (EII) in that
the allocation x0 should be chosen for the second economy as long as (i) x is
chosen for the ﬁrst economy, (ii) x0 is feasible, and (iii) x0 generates the same
opportunity set for every individual as x.
(SEII) can be further decomposed. It turns out that (SEII) embodies an
element relating to dimensional changes in endowments of commodities. To
capture this idea formally, we introduce a deﬁnition ﬁrst. Letting x ∈ Rm
+
and cm
i ∈ CM and letting K be a proper subset of M,w es a yt h a teach







i (xK,x M\K),w h e r exK ≡ (xf)f∈K. Therefore, a
commodity is useless for an individual at a commodity bundle x if it does
not “contribute” anything to this individual’s opportunity set under x.
Independence of Useless New Commodities (INC): Let e =( M,cm,x) ∈
EM,a n dl e te0 =( M ∪ L,cm+l,(x,y)) ∈ EM∪L,w h e r eM ∩ L = ∅,b es u c h
that (1) for any x =( xi)i∈N ∈ WE(e), there exists (yx








i (xi)( ∀i ∈ N)and (xi,y
x
i )i∈N ∈ WE(e
0),
and (2) there exists b x =( b xi)i∈N ∈ WE(e) such that each good of L is
useless for every agent i ∈ N at (b xi,0) ∈ R
m+l
+ . Then, b x ∈ ϕ(e) if and only
if (b xi,0)i∈N ∈ ϕ(e0).
(INC) essentially requires that, by adding useless new commodities to an
economy, those allocations that “preserve” the original allocations chosen by
an allocation rule for the original economy and use none of the useless new
commodities should continue to be chosen from the “enlarged” economy by
the allocation rule.
17The characterization of the egalitarian allocation rule is summarized in
the following theorem, Theorem 2.
Theorem 2: The egalitarian allocation rule ϕE is the unique rule satisfying
(WEE), (ES), (ECI), (EII), and (INC).
To prove Theorem 2, we ﬁrst prove the following series of lemmas. The
proof of Theorem 2 will then follow. In Lemma 1, we shall establish the
following result: Given any two economies that generate the same set of
possible opportunity assignments, if an allocation rule satisﬁes (WEE), (F)
and (INC), then the sets of all opportunity assignments attained by the
allocations chosen by the allocation rule under the two economies must be
the same. Formally:
Lemma 1: Let e1, e2 ∈ E be such that e1 =( M,cm,x) ∈ EM, e2 =
(L,cl,y) ∈ EL, and C(e1)=C(e2). Then, the allocation rule ϕ which satisﬁes
(WEE), (F), and (INC) has the following property: c(ϕ(e1)) = c(ϕ(e2)).
Proof. Let e1, e2 ∈ E be such that e1 =( M,cm,x) ∈ EM, e2 =( L,cl,y) ∈
EL,a n dC(e1)=C(e2)=C. In the following, we will construct another
economy e3 =( S,cs,z) ∈ ES such that s = m + l and C(e3)=C(e1)=
C(e2). Then, it will be shown that (WEE), (F), and (INC) imply c(ϕ(e1)) =
c(ϕ(e3)). After showing this claim, we will show that (WEE), (F), and (INC)
imply c(ϕ(e2)) = c(ϕ(e3)). Then, c(ϕ(e1)) = c(ϕ(e2)) will follow easily.
Let S be a set of commodities such that #S = s ≡ m + l.F o r e a c h
C ∈ C,t h e r ee x i s tx ∈ A(e1) and y ∈ A(e2) such that cm
i (xi)=Ci = cl
i (yi)
for each i ∈ N. This property implies that, for each i ∈ N,t h e r ee x i s t sa
bijection τi :[ 0 ,x] → [0,y] such that for each x ∈ [0,x], cm
i (x)=cl
i (τi (x)),








.W et h e nd e ﬁne, for each i ∈ N






















From the construction, it follows that c∗
i ∈ CS for each i ∈ N.D e ﬁne
e3 =( S,c∗,(x,y)) with c∗ =( c∗
i)i∈N. Then, C(e3)=C.N e x t , f o r e a c h
i ∈ N, let us deﬁne b ci : Rs
+ ³ Rk
+ as: b ci (xi,y)=cm
i (xi) for any y ∈ Rl
+.
Deﬁne b e1 =( S,b c,(x,y)) with b c =( b ci)i∈N. Then, C(b e1)=C.
18Compare e3 and b e1. By construction, for any (x,y) ∈ Rs
+, b ci (x,y) ⊇
c∗
i (x,y) holds for each i ∈ N.M o r e o v e r ,f o ra n y (x,y) ∈ Rs
+ with (x,y) ≤
(x,y),t h e r ee x i s t s(δ(x),δ(y)) ∈ Rs
+ with (δ(x),δ (y)) ≥ (x,y) such that
b ci (x,y)=c∗
i (δ(x),δ(y)). In fact, for instance, if δ(x)=x and δ(y)=
(y ∨ τi (x)),w h e r ex∨x0 ≡ (max{xh,x 0
h})h∈M,t h e nb ci (x,y)=c∗
i (δ(x),δ(y))
holds. Then, let us deﬁne a new commodity space Rs
+ × R
t(i)
+ ,w i t ht(i)=s
and wi ∈ R
t(i)












= b ci (x,y);
(ii) b c∗
i (x,y,0) = c∗
i (x,y);
(iii) for any w ≤ wi,t h e r ee x i s t s(x0,y0) ∈ Rs
+ with x ≤ x0 ≤ δ(x) and
y ≤ y0 ≤ δ(y) such that b c∗
i (x,y,w)=c∗
i (x0,y 0);a n d
(iv) for any w,w0 ≤ wi with w ≥ w0, b c∗
i (x,y,w) ⊇ b c∗
i (x,y,w0).






Let us denote the set of commodities in R
t(i)
+ by T(i).S u c h b c∗
i can be con-
structed to meet b c∗
i ∈ CS∪T(i).
Given (b c∗














+ ,a n dap r o ﬁle of new correspondences (b c∗∗
i )i∈N as









+ is given by: for each








i (x,y,w1,...,w n)=b c∗
i (x,y,wi).




+ by T.D e ﬁne a new
economy b e∗∗ ≡ (S ∪ T,b c∗∗,(x,y,
¡
wi¢
i∈N)) ∈ E with b c∗∗ ≡ (b c∗∗
i )i∈N. Then,
C(b e∗∗)=C s t i l lh o l d s ,s i n c eC(b e∗∗)=C(e3)=C(b e1).







in the allocation (b x,b y, b w),s i n c e ,b yt h ec o n s t r u c t i o n
of b c∗∗,e v e r yc o m m o d i t yi nT(i) is only useful for i ∈ N in the sense that
this is useless for any other individual at (b x,b y, b w). Moreover, by (WEE) and








i (b xi,b yi,0)=c∗
i (b xi,b yi) for








i (b xi,b yi,0) for some i ∈ N,
it implies that either
P








j (b xj,b yj,0)=
c∗
j (b xj,y j (b xj)) with b yj >y j (b xj) holding for some other j ∈ N.T h e n , b y
reallocating y from (b yi)i∈N to (yi (b xi))i∈N with
P
















i (b xi,y i (b xi),0) for each






i∈N ∈ ϕ(b e∗∗) implies (b xi,b yi,0)i∈N ∈ ϕ(b e∗∗)
by (WEE) and (F), and each of the commodities T is useless for each i ∈ N
19at (b xi,b yi,0).
















= b ci (xi,y i) holds for every i ∈ N.
Then, by (INC), (b x,b y) ∈ ϕ(b e1).B y( F ) ,C(b e∗∗)=C(b e1) implies c(ϕ(b e∗∗)) =
c(ϕ(b e1)).
Compare b e∗∗ and e3.F o r a n y (x,y) ∈ WE(e3), (x,y,0) ∈ WE(b e∗∗)
holds, and b c∗∗
i (xi,y i,0)=c∗
i (xi,y i) holds for every i ∈ N. Then, by (INC),
(b x,b y) ∈ ϕ(e3).B y( F ) ,C(b e∗∗)=C(b e3) implies c(ϕ(b e∗∗)) = c(ϕ(b e3)).
Compare b e1 and e1. For any x ∈ WE(e1), (x,y) ∈ WE(b e1) and
b ci (xi,y i)=cm
i (xi) hold for any y ∈Rnl
+ and every i ∈ N. Moreover, any
commodity in L is useless for each i ∈ N at (xi,0) under b e1. Thus, by
(INC), b x ∈ ϕ(e1).B y( F ) ,C(b e1)=C(e1) implies c(ϕ(b e1)) = c(ϕ(e1)).
Note that cm(b x)=c∗ (b x,b y). By (F), C(e3)=C(e1) implies c(ϕ(e1)) =
c(ϕ(e3)).
Lemma 2: (WEE), (EII), and (INC) imply (SEII).
Proof. Let e1, e2 ∈ E be such that e1 =( M,cm,x) ∈ EM, e2 =( L,cl,y) ∈
EL,a n dC(e1)=C(e2). Noting that (EII) implies (F), by Lemma 1,
c(ϕ(e1)) = c(ϕ(e2)). Then, it follows that (EII) implies (SEII).
Lemma 3: (WEE), (F), (ECI), and (INC) imply (CI).
Proof. Let C,C0 ∈ Σ be such that C ⊇ C0 and F(C) ∩ C0 6= ∅. Then, there
exist e1 =( M,cm,x),e2 =( L,cl,y) ∈ E such that C(e1)=C and C(e2)=C0.
We will construct two new economies e3 =( S,ck,z),e4 =( S,ck,z0) ∈ E such
that z ≥ z0, C(e3)=C,a n dC(e4)=C0. Then, (WEE), (F), (ECI), and
(INC) imply that F(C0)=F(C) ∩ C0.
Let S be a set of commodities such that #S = s ≡ m + l. Because
C(e1) ⊇ C(e2),f o re a c hC ∈ C(e2),t h e r ee x i s tx ∈ A(e1) and y ∈ A(e2)
such that cm
i (xi)=Ci = cl
i (yi) for each i ∈ N. Then, let us construct
c∗ =( c∗
i)i∈N as in the proof of Lemma 1.D e ﬁne e∗ =( S,c∗,(x,y)) with
c∗ =( c∗
i)i∈N. Then, C(e∗)=C(e2) holds. Deﬁne b e1 =( S,b c,(x,y)) with
b c =( b ci)i∈N, as in the proof of Lemma 1. Then, C(b e1)=C(e1).
Next, deﬁne b e∗∗ ≡ (S ∪ T,b c∗∗,(x,y,
¡
wi¢
i∈N)) ∈ E with b c∗∗ ≡ (b c∗∗
i )i∈N
exactly as in the proof of Lemma 1. Then, C(b e∗∗)=C(e1) holds. Moreover,
deﬁne another new economy e∗∗ ≡ (S ∪ T,b c∗∗,(x,y,0)) ∈ E with b c∗∗ ≡
(b c∗∗
i )i∈N. Then, C(e∗∗)=C(e2) holds. By (ECI), we have c(ϕ(e∗∗)) =
20c(ϕ(b e∗∗))∩C(e∗∗).B y( W E E ) ,( F ) ,( E C I ) ,a n d( I N C ) ,a n df r o mLemma 1,
we obtain c(ϕ(e∗∗)) = c(ϕ(e2)) and c(ϕ(b e∗∗)) = c(ϕ(e1)).
Lemma 4: (WEE), (F), (ECI), (ES), and (INC) imply (S).
Proof. Let C be a symmetric problem such that it contains identical assign-
ments among which there is one, say C∗,t h a ti sw e a k l ye ﬃcient. Then, there
exists e =( M,cm,x) ∈ EM such that C(e)=C. In the following discussion,
we will construct a new economy e0 =( L,cl,y) ∈ EL such that cl
i = cl
j for
all i,j ∈ N and C(e0) ⊇ C,a n dG(C(e0)) = G(C). Once such an economy is
given, we will show that (WEE), (F), (ES), and (INC) imply C∗ ∈ F(C(e0))
and {G(C∗)} = G(F(C(e0))).F u r t h e r m o r e ,s i n c eC∗ ∈ C,b y( W E E ) ,( F ) ,
(ECI), and (INC), C∗ ∈ F(C) and {G(C∗)} = G(F(C)) will follow from
Lemma 3. This will imply that (S) holds.










∈ E. Then, since C(e) is symmetric, C(e{1,2}) is also





with #M1,2 =2 m as follows: for each i ∈ {1,2},l e t ,f o re a c h(x1,x 2) ∈ R2m
+ ,
c2m
i (x1,x 2) ≡ cm
1 (x1) ∩ cm
2 (x2). In addition, for any other i ∈ N\{1,2},
let, for each (x1,x 2) ∈ R2m
+ , c2m
i (x1,x 2)=cm
i (x1). Then, C(e1,2) ⊇ C and
G(C(e1,2)) = G(C).I fN = {1,2},t h e ne1,2 is an economy with c2m
i = c2m
j
for all i,j ∈ N.






































with #M1,2,3 =4 m as
follows: for each i ∈ {1,2,3}, let, for each (x1,x 2,x 3,x 4) ∈ R4m
+ , c4m
i (x1,x 2,x 3,x 4)=
c2m
1 (x1,x 2) ∩ c2m
3 (x3,x 4). In addition, for any other i ∈ N\{1,2,3},l e t ,
for each (x1,x 2,x 3,x 4) ∈ R4m
+ , c4m
i (x1,x 2,x 3,x 4)=c2m
i (x1,x 2). Then,
C(e1,2,3) ⊇ C(e1,2) and G(C(e1,2,3)) = G(C(e1,2)).I f N = {1,2,3},t h e n
e1,2,3 is an economy with c4m
i = c4m
j for all i,j ∈ N.














with (x,...,x) ∈ R2n−1m











= G(C) hold. Then, since C∗ is weakly
eﬃcient in C, the identical assignment C∗ is weakly eﬃcient in C(e(1,...,n)).
21Proof of Theorem 2. It is easy to check that ϕE satisﬁes (WEE), (ES),
(ECI), (EII), and (INC). Suppose that ϕ satisﬁes (WEE), (ES), (ECI), (EII),
and (INC). Then, by Lemmas 2, 3,a n d4, ϕ attains a bargaining solution
which satisﬁes (WE), (S), (CI), and (II). By Theorem 1, ϕ attains FE.
In Theorem 2, the independence of the axioms can be checked as fol-
lows. For (WEE), the allocation rule ϕ such that ϕ(e)={0} for each e
satisﬁes all of the axioms but (WEE); for (ES), the Nash allocation rule ϕN
which attains the Nash solution [Xu and Yoshihara (2006a)] to (opportunity)-
bargaining problems satisﬁes all of the axioms but (ES); for (ECI), the Kalai-
Smorodinsky allocation rule ϕK which attains the Kalai-Smorodinsky solu-
tion [Xu and Yoshihara (2006a)] to (opportunity)-bargaining problems sat-
isﬁes all of the axioms but (ECI); for (EII), an allocation rule which attains
a proper subsolution of the egalitarian solution FE satisﬁes all of the axioms




ϕE (e) if cm
i = cm
j for all i,j ∈ N in e =( M,cm,x) ∈ E;
ϕN (e) otherwise.
This ϕ∗ satisﬁes (WEE), (ES), (ECI), and (EII), but (INC). This is because
c(ϕ∗(e1)) 6= c(ϕ∗(e2)) generally holds for C(e1)=C(e2) if cm
i = cm
j for all
i,j ∈ N in e1 and cl
i 6= cl
j for some i,j ∈ N in e2. Then, by Lemma 1, ϕ∗
violates (INC).
5 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, we have extended the standard bargaining model to situations
in which players are characterized by their opportunity sets rather than by
their utilities7 and in which the fair arbitrator makes the recommendation
with the guiding principle of equal opportunity for all players. In such a
setting, we have formulated our problems in terms of bargaining problems
among players on opportunity assignments, deﬁned the egalitarian solution
in our context and studied it axiomatically. Most of the axioms used in
our axiomatic characterization of the proposed solutions correspond to their
counterparts in standard bargaining models, but formulated either in terms
7It may be remarked that, when k =1(there is only one basic living condition), our
model reduces to the standard non-convex bargaining problem.
22of opportunity assignments or directly in economic environments. We have
discussed and commented on the axioms that are unique in our context.
In what follows, we shall present a discussion of our egalitarian solution
and make a connection between our egalitarian solution and the notion of
equality of opportunity proposed by Roemer (1998).
Structurally, the egalitarian solution of bargaining over opportunity as-
signments and the standard egalitarian solution to the problems of utility
allocations are similar. However, their conceptual implications are quite dif-
ferent.
First, our ϕE attempts to capture the idea of equality of opportunity,
whereas the egalitarian solution for the standard bargaining problems is
based on the idea of equality of outcome or equality of welfare. The egalitar-
ian principle based on outcomes or welfares has been under critical scrutiny
in recent years and rival theories of equality based on opportunities have
been advocated by several people. For instance, Sen (1980) proposed equal-
ity of capabilities, which requires equalizing opportunities among individuals
to realize their functionings, and contrasted and emphasized the diﬀerence
between equality of outcome in any form and equality of capabilities in their
respective performances. Our ϕE c a nb ev i e w e da sam e c h a n i s mt oi m p l e -
ment the idea of equality of capabilities.
Secondly, as we discussed earlier in the Introduction and in Section 2,
there are situations in which bargaining problems are about opportunity as-
signments rather than ﬁnal outcomes or payoﬀs of players. In such cases,
one plausible guiding principle is “leveling players’ playing ﬁelds as much as
possible” (Roemer (1998)). This guiding principle does not necessarily guar-
antee the equalization of players’ ﬁnal outcomes, and our egalitarian solution
is a way to ensure that players have the same playing ﬁeld. The egalitarian
solution to the problems of bargaining over opportunity assignments seems
to ﬁt those situations well.
Thirdly, our ϕE does not actually guarantee equal ﬁnal outcomes for
players. To see this, let us consider the situation discussed in Example 1.
G i v e na na l l o c a t i o nx recommended by ϕE in an economy e =( M,cm,x),
each individual i ∈ N is guaranteed to acquire any level of skills within
cm
i (xi) by devoting his eﬀort appropriately. However, the exact levels of
skills he actually acquires depend on his eﬀort level. Suppose that every
individual has the common utility function u(b,a), which is a function of
realized skill vector b and the eﬀort level a. Each individual i chooses his
eﬀort level ai and bi in order to maximize u(b,a) subject to b ∈ cm
i (xi).
23Let v(cm
i (xi)) ≡ maxb∈cm
i (xi),au(b,a). The standard egalitarian solution










for any i,j ∈ N. On the other hand, ϕE guarantees that, for a given or-






∈ I for any i,j ∈ N, but
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] may not hold for some individuals i,j ∈ N.T h e r e -
fore, the recommendation by ϕE is much diﬀerent from the recommendation
of the standard egalitarian solution. In the context of Example 1,w eb e -
lieve that ϕE is more plausible than the standard egalitarian solution. This
is because the choices of ai and bi are a matter of personal responsibility,
and ϕE delegates this personal responsibility to individual players while the
standard egalitarian solution does not.
H o wi so u ra p p r o a c hi nt h ep a p e rr e l a t e dt ot h etheory of equality of op-
portunity discussed by Roemer (1998)? There are some diﬀerences between
our approach in this paper and Roemer’s model (1998). For example, for
Roemer (1998), the task is to propose a social welfare function that deter-
mines the optimal equal opportunity policy, while in this paper, we deﬁne
and characterize “fair” solutions for bargaining problems based on players’
opportunity sets. There are also similarities between our model and Roe-
mer’s model. In Roemer (1998), the resource allocation determined by the
optimal policy is to guarantee any two individuals the equal opportunity of
access to the same level of “advantages” regardless of their “types”, if their
eﬀort rankings within their own “types” are identical. In our model, an
individual’s type in the sense of Roemer is reﬂected in the individual’s op-
portunity correspondence, and a bargaining solution such as FE determines
a resource allocation to guarantee an equitable assignment of opportunities
among individuals, under which every individual may access to the same level
of living-condition vectors.
References
1. Arneson, R. (1989): “Equality and equal opportunity for welfare,” Philo-
sophical Studies 56,7 7 - 9 3 .
2. Cohen, G.A. (1993): “Equality of what ? On welfare, goods, and capa-
bilities,” in The Quality of Life, (edited by Nussbaum, M. and A. Sen),
Oxford Univ. Press: Oxford, 9-29.
3. Gaertner, W. and Y. Xu (2006): “Capability as the Basis for a New
24Measure of the Standard of Living,” Journal of Human Development
7(3), 311-321.
4. Gorman, W. (1980): “The demand for related goods: a possible pro-
cedure for analysing quality diﬀerentials in the egg market,” Review of
Economic Studies 47,8 4 3 - 8 5 6 .
5. Gotoh, R. and N. Yoshihara (2003): “A class of fair distribution rules
al aR a w l sa n dS e n , ”Economic Theory 22, 63-88.
6. Herrero, C. (1996): “Capabilities and utilities,” Economic Design 2,
69-88.
7. Herrero, C. (1997): “Equitable opportunities: An extension,” Eco-
nomics Letters 55,9 1 - 9 5 .
8. Kalai, E., (1977): “Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations:
Interpersonal Utility Comparisons,” Econometirca 45, 1623-1630.
9. Kalai, E., and M. Smorodinsky (1975): “Other Solutions to Nash’s
Bargaining Problem,” Econometirca 43, 513-518.
10. Kranich, L. (1996): “Equitable opportunities: An axiomatic approach,”
Journal of Economic Theory 71,1 3 1 - 1 4 7 .
11. Lancaster, K. J., (1966): “A new approach to consumer theory,” Jour-
nal of Political Economy 74,1 3 2 - 5 7 .
12. Nash, J. F. (1950): “The bargaining problem,” Econometrica, 18,1 5 5 -
162.
13. Nussbaum, M. (1988): “Nature, function and capability: Aristotle on
political distribution,” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, I (sup-
plementary), 145-84.
14. Nussbaum, M. (1993): “Non-relative virtues: an Aristotelian approach”,
in M. Nussbaum and A.K. Sen (eds.), The Quality of Life, Clarendon
Press, Oxford.
15. Nussbaum, M. (2000): Women and Human Development: The Capa-
bility Approach,K a l if o rW o m e n ,N e wD e l h i .
2516. Pattanaik, P.K. and Y. Xu (1990): “On ranking opportunity sets in
terms of freedom of choice,” Recherches Economiques de Louvain, 56,
383-390.
17. Pattanaik, P.K. and Y. Xu (2000): “On ranking opportunity sets in
economic environments,” Journal of Economic Theory 93(1),4 8 - 7 1 .
18. Pattanaik, P.K. and Y. Xu (2007): “Minimal relativism, dominance,
and standard of living comparisons based on functionings,” Oxford Eco-
nomic Papers 59(2),3 5 4 - 3 7 4 .
19. Roemer, J. E., (1988): “Axiomatic bargaining theory on economic en-
vironments,” Journal of Economic Theory 45,1 - 3 1 .
20. Roemer, J.E. (1998): Equality of opportunity, Harvard Univ. Press:
Cambridge.
21. Savaglio, E. and S. Vannucci (2006): “On the volume-ranking of op-
p o r t u n i t ys e t si ne c o n o m i ce n v i r o n m e n t s , ”mimeo.
22. Sen, A. K. (1980): “Equality of what ?” in Tanner Lectures on Human
Values. Vol. 1, (edited by McMurrin, S.), Cambridge Univ. Press:
Cambridge.
2 3 .S e n ,A .K .( 1 9 8 5 ) :Commodities and capabilities, Amsterdam: North-
Holland.
2 4 .S e n ,A .K .( 2 0 0 2 ) :Rationality and freedom, Harvard University Press:
Cambridge, MA.
25. Thomson, W. (1983): “Equity in exchange economies,” Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory 29, 217-244.
26. Xu, Y. (2002): “Functioning, capability, and the standard of living–an
axiomatic approach,” Economic Theory 20,3 8 7 - 3 9 9 .
27. Xu, Y. (2004): “On ranking linear budget sets in terms of freedom of
choice,” Social Choice and Welfare 22(1),2 8 1 - 2 8 9 .
28. Xu, Y. and N. Yoshihara (2006): “Alternative characterizations of three
bargaining solutions for nonconvex problems,” Games and Economic
Behaviors 57,8 6 - 9 2 .
2629. Xu, Y. and N. Yoshihara (2006a): “Axiomatic bargaining theory on
opportunity assignments,” IER Discussion Paper N. 473, The Institute
of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University, Jan 2006.
30. Yoshihara, N., (2003): “Characterizations of bargaining solutions in
production economies with unequal skills,” Journal of Economic The-
ory 108,2 5 6 - 2 8 5 .
31. Yoshihara, N., (2006): “Solidarity and cooperative bargaining solu-
tions,” in A. Wieczorek, M. Malawski, and A. Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel,
eds., Game Theory and Mathematical Economics, Banach Center Pub-


















































() () () () CI GF b y
∗∗ ∈ re C ɹ • () ()
* G e C
() () () G π
∗ e C























() () () ()    Sy
E GF b y
ΔΔ ∈ re C ɹ
E Δ r •



















() () () GF
∗∗ ∈ re C ɹ •
• () () ()() () () ()      CI
E GF GF b y
Δ∗ Δ ∈∩ re e CC
contradiction
Figure 4: Theorem 1 (4)